#110 · IDOR / privilege escalation via predictable IDs
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An MR completes this bounty when it is merged into main with Closes #110 and GitLab closes the issue. A mention or an updated timestamp is not completion. Awarded points appear in Activity.
cp .dev.vars.example .dev.vars && pnpm dev, after rebasing on main) and fully test your change before opening the MR.
Description
Any endpoint that returns or mutates data keyed on a user-supplied ID without verifying the requesting user owns that ID.
Likely surfaces
/profile/<userId>— does it leak private fields when target_userId != session.userId?- Award-request approve/reject — does it check the row belongs to the admin's review-set, or just trust the URL ID?
- Field Notes article visibility — community vs private
- Task Exchange bid endpoints
- Anywhere a numeric autoincrement ID flows through a URL
Want to demonstrate
A concrete repro: as user A, modify or read user B's data.
--- *This is NOT a normal bounty. Do not post a public PoC or a public PR demonstrating the vulnerability. Submit findings via the bug-report form at https://score.irregulars.io/contribute#report-bug, or email security@irregularchat.com, or DM an admin on Signal. Awards are admin-determined based on impact: low=50 / medium=150 / high=300 / critical=500 / rce=750.*
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Activity
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