#111 · Idempotency abuse to double-award points
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An MR completes this bounty when it is merged into main with Closes #111 and GitLab closes the issue. A mention or an updated timestamp is not completion. Awarded points appear in Activity.
cp .dev.vars.example .dev.vars && pnpm dev, after rebasing on main) and fully test your change before opening the MR.
Description
The award system relies on a unique index on (source_service, source_id). Any way to bypass it qualifies.
Likely surfaces
- Race conditions in
INSERT OR IGNORE+ counter increment inapps/scoreboard/src/api/award.ts - Crafted
source_idvalues that exploit SQLite collation differences (NOCASE vs default) - Webhook replay with subtly different MR IDs
- The
first:<user_id>idempotency key — can you trigger anotherfirst_contributionfor yourself? - The
bug_report:<request_id>source_id — collision possible if request_id wraps?
What qualifies
- Demonstrate two
point_eventsrows with the same logical "thing" awarding twice - Or a way to negate someone else's points (revoke a row you didn't earn)
--- *This is NOT a normal bounty. Do not post a public PoC or a public PR demonstrating the vulnerability. Submit findings via the bug-report form at https://score.irregulars.io/contribute#report-bug, or email security@irregularchat.com, or DM an admin on Signal. Awards are admin-determined based on impact: low=50 / medium=150 / high=300 / critical=500 / rce=750.*
Relevant files
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Hints
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Activity
No points have been awarded for this bounty yet.
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